Thank you for your thoughtful response, Caleb. I will do my best to address your criticisms.
First, I maintain that Representative Omar was right when she declared that “we must have the same level of accountability and justice for all victims of crimes against humanity.”
That said, your point about her subsequent clarification regarding an implied “moral comparison between Hamas and the Taliban and the U.S. and Israel” is well-taken. But my own point (as well as Professor Zinn’s) was that even an admitted difference of intentions in no way ensures a different outcome. As he explained, “even if you grant that the intention is not to kill civilians, if they nevertheless become victims, again and again and again, can that be called an accident? If the deaths of civilians are inevitable in bombing, it may not be deliberate, but it is not an accident, and the bombers cannot be considered innocent. They are committing murder as surely as are the terrorists.” Thus, I would argue that even the acknowledged distinction between the intentions of terrorist organizations (such as Hamas and the Taliban) and those of nation-states (like the U.S. and Israel) is becoming more and more a distinction without a difference.
As for the “agreed rules of war” you mention, The United Nations Charter of 1945 outlines a series of doctrines collectively defining the twin pillars of “Just War Theory,” jus ad bellum (the “right to go to war”) and jus in bello (“right conduct in war”). Among these, according to the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, is the so-called “proportionality rule,” also known as the collateral damage rule,
"a central operational provision of the law of the conduct of hostilities. That rule emanates from the fundamental rule of distinction between military personnel (combatants) and military objects, on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects, on the other hand. Civilians and civilian objects may not be attacked. Combatants and military objects can be attacked. When a combatant kills or injures an opposing combatant or destroys a military object it is not a crime under the laws of armed combat. Although civilians or civilian objects may end up being killed, injured, or destroyed in warfare, such casualties are only tolerated when the civilian destruction is incidental to an attack on a legitimate military target, and then only when the civilian casualties are not considered likely to be 'excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.'"
This is important because, in your response, you claim that “the United States and Israel, in particular, go above and beyond the rules of war. Israel sends advance warning notices and drops non-lethal munitions before using smart bombs to carefully target military objectives.”
But as The New York Times reported as early as 2012, smart bombs and drone strikes are not nearly as precise as initial reports suggest, noting that even our own government routinely counts “all military-age males [those 16 and older] in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent…. Counter-terrorism officials insist this approach is one of simple logic: people in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good.”
As The Times went on to explain:
"This counting method may partly explain the official claims of extraordinarily low collateral deaths. In a speech last year Mr. Brennan, Mr. Obama's trusted adviser, said that not a single noncombatant had been killed in a year of strikes. And in a recent interview, a senior administration official said that the number of civilians killed in drone strikes in Pakistan under Mr. Obama was in the 'single digits' - and that independent counts of scores or hundreds of civilian deaths unwittingly draw on false propaganda claims by militants.
But in interviews, three former senior intelligence officials expressed disbelief that the number could be so low. The C.I.A. accounting has so troubled some administration officials outside the agency that they have brought their concerns to the White House. One called it 'guilt by association' that has led to 'deceptive' estimates of civilian casualties. 'It bothers me when they say there were seven guys, so they must all be militants,' the official said. 'They count the corpses and they’re not really sure who they are.'"
And as the UK organization Action on Armed Violence reported in 2019,
"There are, essentially, two categories of drone strikes deployed by the US: Personality Strikes and Signature Strikes. Personality Strikes are directed towards individuals engaged in hostile activities…. [while] Signature Strikes are of a notably different nature. According to Kristina Benson, these strikes depend on a 'pattern of behaviour – or ‘signature’ as a proxy for determining if that individual is engaging in a ‘continuous combat function’ or is directly participating in hostilities.' The exact identities of these individuals are often unknown when the strike occurs and are not revealed in a post-strike analysis. Signature Strikes often end up killing individuals prior to them actually or possibly actively engaging in combat. They are killed based on a pattern of behaviour which purportedly indicates the likelihood of their future engagement in a combat function. It is, in a sense, a form of ‘Minority Report’ justice – where individuals are deemed a threat, even if they have not carried out such hostilities.
They conclude (as do I) that:
"The US drone programme has inflicted severe damage on communities, families, and lives across the globe. This impact is compounded by assumptions about masculinity and militancy. The category of military-age males obfuscates and prevents proper oversight of US counterterrorism policies. It denies victims and their families the status of civilians. The US’ dependency on militarised masculinities for both targeting and casualty assessments also prevents legitimate oversight from happening. Only when civilian casualties are properly counted, including data on gender and age, can we really scrutinise the whole ethical and legal impacts of modern drone conflicts."
